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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Sharron Amanda Bills appeals from her conviction for trafficking in heroin with a
persistent violator enhancement, possession of methamphetamine, and possession of
paraphernalia. She challenges the denial of her motion to suppress evidence.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Bills with trafficking in seven grams or more of heroin,
possession of methamphetamine, and possession of drug paraphernalia, with a persistent
violator sentencing enhancement. (R., pp. 56-62.) Bills moved to suppress evidence
obtained as a result of the execution of a search warrant. (R., pp. 74-83.) Relevant to this
appeal, she moved to suppress evidence of contraband found during a search of her person
during the execution of a search warrant at her residence, and statements made in response
to interrogation after discovery of the contraband. (R., pp. 76-78.) The state responded.
(R., pp. 84-97.) The state argued that the search of Bills' person was a proper frisk for

weapons, and, even if not, that suppression of evidence did not follow because of inevitable
discovery. (R., pp. 90-95.) The district court granted the motion in part and denied it in
part after a hearing. (R., pp. 106-123.) Relevant to this appeal, the district court found that
the frisk was an improper search, but because the evidence found on Bills' person would
have been inevitably discovered in a subsequent search incident to a valid arrest, neither
that evidence nor her statements in relation to being confronted with that evidence would
be suppressed. (R., pp. 117-19, 121-22.)
Bills entered a conditional guilty plea to all charges preserving "the right to appeal
the Court's decisions" prior to entry of the plea. (Tr., p. 11, L. 4 - p. 20, L. 24.) The
1

district court entered judgment and Bills filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp. 156-61,
165-68.)

2

ISSUE
Bills states the issue

Did

on appeal

the district court err

Mimnda

as:

when

it

declined t0 suppress Ms. Bills’ post-

answers t0 police questioning about an item they had just seized

from her pants during the constitutionally—unlawful weapons search?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 5.)

The

state rephrases the issue as:

Has Bills failed to show that the district court erred when it concluded that Bills
was not entitled t0 suppression 0f statements she made When confronted With admissible
evidence?

ARGUMENT
Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Concluded That Bills
Was Not Entitled To Suppression Of Statements She Made When Confronted With

Bills

Admissible Evidence
A.

Introduction

The district court reasoned that evidence ofthe contraband acquired by the unlawﬁll
frisk

of Bills’ person would inevitably have been discovered as the result of her subsequent

lawful arrest. (R., pp. 117-19, 121-22.) Bills does not dispute that the physical evidence

found 0n her person was properly found

t0

be admissible under the inevitable discovery

exception, but contends her verbal statements remain inadmissible as the fruit of the

unlawful

frisk.

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-1

1.)

Bills’

argument

fails

because the

district

court properly found that being confronted with admissible evidence did not require

suppression 0f her statements.

B.

Standard

Of Review

The standard of review of a suppression motion
a motion t0 suppress

is

is

bifurcated.

challenged, the appellate court accepts the

fact that are supported

by

When a decision on

trial

court’s ﬁndings 0f

substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of

constitutional principles to those facts.

State V. Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496, 148 P.3d

1240, 1242 (2006).

C.

Because The Direct Evidence Of The Unlawﬁll Frisk Was Untainted, The Indirect
Evidence Of The Statements, Made As A Result Of Being Confronted With The
Untainted Evidence, Were Likewise Untainted

“The exclusionary

rule is the judicial

remedy

for addressing illegal searches

bars the admission or use of evidence gathered pursuant t0 the illegal search.”

and

State V.

Bu_nting, 142 Idaho 908, 915, 136 P.3d 379,

Supreme Court has

386

(Ct.

“The United

App. 2006).

articulated the three exceptions” t0 the exclusionary rule, “independent

origin, inevitable discovery,

and attenuated basis.” Stuart

P.3d 1278, 1283 (2001). The question underlying

V. State,

136 Idaho 490, 495, 36

three exceptions “is whether, granting

all

establishment 0f the primary illegality, the evidence t0 which instant obj ection

been come

at

by

States

exploitation

of that

made has

or instead

by means sufﬁciently

Wong Sun V.

United States, 371 U.S.

illegality

distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.”

is

471, 488 (1963) (internal quotation omitted).

The
even

if the

inevitable discovery doctrine

makes suppression 0f evidence improper Where,

evidence was actually obtained by constitutionally improper means, the

prosecution establishes by a preponderance 0f proof that the evidence inevitably would

have been found by lawful means. Nix
Idaho

at

497-98, 36 P.3d

at

V.

1285-86.

Williams, 467 U.S. 43 1, 444

The underlying

467 U.S.

at

984);

Smit, 136

rationale of this rule

suppression should leave the prosecution in the same position
the police misconduct, not a worse one. N_iX,

(1

it

is

that

would have been absent

442-44; State

V.

Buterbaugh, 138

Idaho 96, 102, 57 P.3d 807, 813 (Ct. App. 2002).

The

district court’s application

of these standards

evidence found as a result 0f the unconstitutional
Bills’ statements

Bills” later,

and

frisk,

legal, arrest

and

and search incident

both the physical evidence and

thereto.

(R., pp. 119, 121-122.)

Bills does not challenge, that the physical evidence

suppressible because “discovery 0f the clear cylinder and

The

straight—forward: A11 of the

about that evidence, would have been obtained by the state as a result 0f

district court held,

(R., p. 119.)

is

district court

then proceeded t0

its

contents

was

The

was not

truly inevitable.”

ﬁnd that Bills” “subsequent answers were

knowingly and voluntarily made regarding the non-suppressible drugs found on her
person.” (R., p. 121.) The rule, Which requires suppression 0f statements elicited through
suppressible

does

evidence,

not

“require

the

0f voluntary, properly-

suppression

Mirandized statements, regarding admissible evidence.”

(R.,

pp 120-122.)

Certainly the physical evidence recovered during the unlawful frisk
tied With the illegality than the subsequent statements. Indeed,

that statements about

and inspired by physical evidence are

physical evidence that prompts the statements

district court correctly

is itself

it

makes

more

little

of an

fruits

is

not a “fruit” 0f the

closely

sense to say

illegality if the

illegality.

The

concluded that because the physical evidence recovered in the

unlawful frisk was admissible and untainted, that the statements that were the

fruits

0f the

fruits

0f the

admissible physical evidence were likewise untainted.
Bills argues that “the statements

illegal

were suppressible because they were

search—not because they were made

in

suppressible,” and therefore the district court erred

by

Idaho 235, 880 P.2d 265 (Ct. App. 1994). (Appellant’s
Bills’ reliance

on

m

First, Bills”

m.

The

m

is

at

to

evidence

that

was

distinguishing State V. Luna, 126

brief, pp.

9-10 (emphasis added).)

unpersuasive.

argument

is

not based on the actual language 0r analysis employed in

court speciﬁcally stated that the statements at issue were “secondary

evidence derivedfrom the illegally seized evidence

P.2d

response

itself.”

Lu_na,

126 Idaho

at

239, 880

269 (emphasis added, quotations omitted). The rationale of the court was

that the

exclusionary rule was not limited to direct products of the unlawful search but also

extended to “indirect” products, such as statements.

by

the defendant as a result 0f being confronted

by

Li.

The court held: “Statements made

the police With the fruits of an illegal

search constitute the fruit of the poisonous tree and are inadmissible in evidence in a
criminal prosecution.” Li.
Bills ignores that her statements are considered derivative

0f the

evidence and only the “indirect” product of the unlawful search.
suppressiblity of the primary evidence

suppressed

is

is

Her claim

unpersuasive in light ofthe holding that such statements are

inevitable discovery

means

that Bills”

that the

Whether the statements should be

irrelevant t0

That the evidence found on her person was not the

illegally seized

fruits

of the

fruit.

of the unlawful search by Virtue of

fruit

statements were not the derivative of being

confronted With suppressible evidence.

The

district court correctly

concluded that while statements made as a result of

being confronted by suppressible evidence are the

produced the evidence, statements made as a
evidence are not

fruit

result

was

tainted.

tainted in the ﬁrst place

Because the evidence

that

is if

0f the unlawful search that

0f being confronted by admissible

of the unlawful search. Contrary to

not need any independent inevitable discovery.1

would have been

fruit

Bills’ analysis, the statements

do

Rather, the only reason the statements

the evidence that produced the statements

produced the statements was untainted, the

statements were likewise untainted. Bills has

shown no

error.

1

Even if such independent inevitable discovery were required, it is present in this case.
The questioning was in relation t0 contraband found on Bills’ person. That questioning
would havefollowed the discovery of the contraband. Because the contraband would have
been inevitably discovered in a search incident to Bills’ arrest, so too would the questioning
have followed the arrest and the discovery 0f the contraband. Had the contraband been
found incident to arrest, the interview regarding the contraband would have then occurred
after the legal discovery

of the contraband.

Either way, Bills

would have made her

statements in response t0 being confronted with admissible evidence.

7

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

DATED this

Court t0 afﬁrm the judgment.

11th day of October, 2019.

/s/

Kenneth K. Jorgensen

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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KIMBERLY A. COSTER
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